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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARL STURDAV ANT, 
Plaitntiff and Appellant:' 
-vs.-
KENNE'TH COVINGTON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8132 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S.TATEMENT OF THE c·ASE 
This action arose out of an automobile accident which 
occurred on the 17th day of November, 1951 on U. S. 
Highway 91 just east of the intersection of Center Street 
in American Fork, Utah. Both vehicles were traveling 
in an easterly direction toward Provo. Plaintiff was pro-
ceeding immediately ahead of the defendant and the acci-
dent was precipitated when the plaintiff, having stopped 
for a red light, started up and proceeded across, and be·-
yond the intersection directly ahead for a total distance 
of about 130 feet when he suddenly jammed on his brakes 
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to stop. Defendant, following, was unable to avoid a rear 
end collision. 
Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages and defend-
ant counterclaimed. The action was tried to a jury in the 
Fourth Judicial District. The jury was instructed in 
regard to the issues of claimed negligence and contri-
butory negligence as ap·plied to the claims of both parties 
(R. 211). Verdicts were returned in favor of the defend-
ant on the plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action, and 
in favor of the plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim, 
no cause of action. In so doing the jury apparently 
found that both drivers v.rere guilty of some negligence 
which proximately contributed to the collision, at least 
it would seem this is the only logical conclusion to be 
drawn since defendant's requested instruction as to 
unavoidable accident (R. 37) was not given by the court 
to the jury. 
On this ap·p·eal plaintiff and appellant contends un-
der Point I that defendant was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law which p·roximately caused the collision and 
under Point II that as a matter of law plaintiff was not 
guilty of negligence or contributory negligence. 
In other words, ap·pellant claims he was entitled to 
a directed verdict. Therefore, if the evidence was such 
as to pres.ent a question of fact for the jury on the issue 
of plaintiff's negligence as either the sole or a c·ontribut-
ing cause of the collision the appellant has no grounds 
for complaint. 
In passing on the question raised, it is fundamental 
that the evidence and all reasonable inferences there-
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from must be construed in the light most favorable to-
ward sustaining the verdicts. Gibbs v. Blue Cab (Utah) 
249 Pac. ( 2) 213 and others. We do not feel that appellant 
has so stated the factual situation and evidence in this 
matter and therefore we prefer to make our own state-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and appellant, Carl Sturdavant, was travel-
ing through Utah on his way to Banning, California, from 
his employment as an engineer in Anchorage, Alaska. 
He was driving a 1947 Cadillac automobile and was alone 
in his automobile at the time of the accident (R. 73). 
Defendant and respondent, Kenneth Covington, likewise 
traveling alone, was on his way to work at the Geneva 
Steel Plant in Utah County from his home in Lehi, Utah, 
in his 1948 Chevrolet automobile at the time of the acci-
dent. The accident occurred a short distance east of the 
intersection of U. S. Highway 91 (Main Street) and 
Center Street in American Fork, Utah at about 3:00 
P.M. (R. 93). The road was dry; the weather clear. 
T·he plaintiff's version of the accident in substance 
is that he entered the City of American Fork traveling 
generally east on U.S. 91 and stopped for the semaphore 
light at Center Street and U.S. 91 in response to a red 
light in the lane of traffic nearest the curb. As the light 
turned to green, a dog entered the street directly in front 
of his automobile and p-roceeded to run along directly 
in front of him as he moved across and beyond the inter-
section. After his vehicle had traveled approximately 130 
feet in this manner the dog came to a dead stop about 
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two or three feet in front of him. He then immediately 
and suddenly stop·p·ed his automobile (R. 77, 107). He 
admitted that he did not signal his intention to stop (R. 
110). From the time he started up from a stopped posi-
tion until he suddenly stopped for the dog, 130 feet across 
and beyond the intersection, he was anticipating "all the 
time" that he m.ight have to stop for the d:og (R. 110). 
He was totally unaware of defendant's automobile which 
was immediately behind him, although he claimed to have 
used two rear view mirrors (R. 108). He accelerated his 
car continuously from the time he started up until the 
time he suddenly stopp·ed (R. 109, 110). His car may have 
rolled forward free of brakes after the impact (R. 111). 
As to the events leading up to the accident, defendant 
Kenneth Covington testified in substance that he first 
noticed the Cadillac automobile about six blocks west of 
the intersection in question when that vehicle passed him 
in the lane next to the center line. He followed the Cadil-
lac at a distance of about 100 feet and just before the 
Cadillac stopped for the red light, it crossed into the 
lane nearest the curb in front of defendant. Defendant 
slowed up to stop for the light also, and as he pulled 
.up immediately behind plaintiff the light changed to 
green. Both vehicles then commenced to move across the 
intersection with the defendant following at a distance 
of about 16 feet. Defendant did not see the dog plaintiff 
testified to, and if it was there it was outside the range 
of his vision. About 50 feet beyond the east cross\valk 
of the intersection the plaintiff suddenly stopped. De-
fendant had no knowledge of the dog in front of plain-
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tiff's car, and because of the suddenness of the stop. and 
the lack of warning or signal or any intimation that an 
emergency might be created defendant was unable to 
avoid colliding with plaintiff, although he did apply his 
brakes (R. 162-164). 
Defendant denies he made any statements to plaintiff 
of the nature of those quoted at the bottom of page 3 of 
appellant's brief, to the effect that he had not seen ap'p;el-
lant's car (R. 165-166). In explaining the conversation 
'Nhich did take place he said: 
"As I recall we got together. I asked him why 
he stopped, and he said he stop·ped for a dog. I 
told him I didn't see any dog, and I couldn't see 
it then. I asked him if he was hurt. He said no. 
And I guess that is about all." (R. 165) 
The physical facts found at the scene were testified 
to by Mr. Boyd Durrant, who at the time was employed 
by the City of American Fork as a police officer. He 
found both vehicles in the immediate area of the acci-
dent and determined that defendant's automobile had left 
16 feet of light tire marks up to the point of collision, and 
that the front wheels of plaintiff's automobile left 2 feet 
6 inches of brake marks (R. 153). 
'Those are the facts in brief. More specific reference 
to items of testimony will be quoted under the points of 
argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS· 
POINT I. THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE, CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE 
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
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POINT II. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT 
WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION FOR 
THE DETERMINATION OF THE JURY. 
POINT III. IF DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT PER 
SE, ANY POSSIBLE ERROR WAS CURED BY THE VER-
DICT OF THE JURY. 
POINT IV. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND THE 
VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT MUST BE ·CONSIDERED 
FROM 'THE STANDPOINT MOST FAVORABLE TO DE-
FENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE, CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE PROPER-
LY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
App·ellant's argument that h·e was free from negli-
gence ignores his own testimony, which shows he had 
ample advance warning that he might have to stop at any 
moment. Plaintiff admitted that he gave no signal of 
the imminence of danger or his intention to stop, yet he 
knew from the time he left a position west of the west 
crosswalk until the collision (a distance of approximately 
130 feet (R .. 107) ) that he might at any time be required 
to stop:. Nevertheless, he continued to accelerate his 
car until he jammed on his brakes. We quote a portion 
of his testimony from the record: 
"Q. Before you came to a stop for the dog you 
had your foot on the accelerator; is that cor-
rect~ 
A. That is possible. 
Q. Did you so testify~ 
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A. That is what I testified to, yes. 
* * * * 
Q. Well, that's correct, is it not~ 
A. That's correct. (R. 109) 
* * * * 
And you took your foot from the accelerator 
and put it on the brake, didn't you, when that 
dog stopped~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, during the time from where you stopped 
for the light until you stopped your car for 
the dog, that was running out in front of you, 
was it~ 
A. He was running along. 
Q. And you were antic~pating all the time you 
might have to stop for that dog? 
A. That's right· 
Q. Your left front window was up, wasn't it, 
closed~ 
A. Well, it was closed after we looked at it after 
the accident. 
Q. You at no time made any arm signal out of 
your left window~ 
A. Well if the window was closed, I am positive 
I didn't roll the window up after the accident. 
(R. 110) 
Q. You are positive you didn't make an arm sig-
nal, aren't you~ 
A. If the window was up I didn't make an arm 
signal. 
• • • • 
Q. Were you watching your speedometer also' 
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A. No, I wasn't. 
· Q. But you did anticipate you might have to stop 
for that dog at any time during that distance~ 
A. That's correct. ( R. 111) 
* * * • 
Q. I mean from the time you first saw it until 
the time of the accident it was in front of 
your car~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. How_far was it, how far was the dog in front 
of your car when you ap·plied brakes to stop~ 
A. About three feet I would judge. 
Q. You stopped practically instantly then~ 
A. I came right up to a stop, yes. 
• • • • 
Q. In p·ractically an instant's time or second's 
·time you had to stop when the dog stop,ped ~ 
A. Well, I was concentrating on stopping if the 
dog stop·ped, yes, for one hundred thirty feet .. 
(R. 112) 
* * * * 
A. I was traveling ap·proximately one hundred 
thirty feet that I was watching the rear-view 
mirror and the dog." (R.l13). 
When viewed simply, the situation presented is one 
in which the forward driver, the plaintiff, knowing the 
presence of an imminent danger and who kilew, or in the 
exercise of due care should have known of the presence 
of a vehicle directly behind him in close proximity, never-
theless traveled a dietance of some 130 feet through and 
beyond an intersection without giving any warning to 
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those behind hhn whose safety might be endangered, 
and then suddenly stopped without any signal or warning 
\Vhatsoever. The lead car driving ahead when the light 
changed to green was an indication to cars following 
that plaintiff intended to go on. Clearly such conduct 
is negligent. The statutory rule governing the conduct 
in question of the plaintiff is contained in 41-6-69 (c) 
Utah Code Anrnotated 1953, as follows: 
"No person shall stop or suddenly decrease 
the speed of a vehicle without first giving an ap-
propriate signal in the manner provided herein 
to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the 
rear when there is an opportunity to give such 
signal." 
A principle of law which is particularly applicable 
to the statute quoted and the facts as outlined herein is 
contained in BZ.as·hfield's Cyc. of Automobile Law and 
P·ractice Vol. 1, Section 706: 
"The driver of a motor vehicle, which ob-
scures the vision along the public highway to such 
an extent as to prevent persons following him 
from observing conditions which ought to be 
knovvn to them to insure their safety, is under 
an obligation to use a reasonable degree of care 
that warning be given of approaching danger to 
those whose view of the impending peril he ob-
structs. * * *" 
A case vvherein a statute identical to the Utah la'v 
and the citation just quoted are construed is Strimple v. 
0. K. Warehouse Co., (l(an.) 98 Pa.c. (2) 169. In that 
action the plaintiff vvas a guest in a vehicle operated by 
her daughter. An employee of defendant \Vas operating 
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a large moving van, which plaintiff's daughter had fol-
lowed for some miles. At the entrance to the intersection 
where the accident occurred there was a slow sign at the 
' side of the road, which plaintiff's daughter was unable 
to see because her vision was obscured by the size of the 
truck. ·The truck driver suddenly slowed his vehicle 
or stopped in response to that sign, but plaintiff's daugh-
ter was unable to avoid colliding with the rear end of 
the truck. There was a dispute in the evidence as to 
whether the truck driver signaled his intention to stop 
or slow down. 
A general verdict was returned in favor of plain-
tiff. In addition certain jnterrogatories were answered 
by the jury. Defendants app·ealed, assigning certain 
errors. In discussing one assignment, namely defend-
ants' demurrer to the evidence, the court said: 
"From an examination of these sections and 
the evidence of the driver of this car, it appears 
that the jury would have been warranted in find-
ing th.at the driver of the truck violated Section 47 
(c) ('No p·erson shall stop or suddenly decrease 
the sp~eed of a vehicle without first giving an ap-
propriate signal in the manner provided herein 
to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the 
rear when there is an opportunity to give such 
signal.') in that he stopped his truck suddenly 
without giving any appropriate signal. The rule 
in point in a situation such as this is stated in 1 
Blashfield Cyc. of Automobile La'v and Practice, 
Perm. Ed., Sec. 706 as follo,vs: 'The driver of a 
motor vehicle, which obscures the vision along 
the public highway to such an extent as to pre-
vent persons following him from observing condi-
10 
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tions which ought to be known to them to insure 
their safety, is under an obligation to use a rea-
sonable degree of care that warning he given of 
approaching danger to those whose view of the im-
pending peril he obstructs. * * *' There is evi-
dence in this case that had the truck been equipped 
as provided in the statute quoted, and the driver 
observed due diligence, he could have given the 
warning as provided in the above quotation." 
In the answers to the interrogatories, the jury did not 
find that the truck driver had failed to signal, and the 
court, concluding that liability must be predicated on (1) 
sudden stopping, and (2) failure to signal, reversed the 
general verdict in the lower court on the ground that the 
jury did not find that the truck driver had failed to sig-
nal. 
In Union Transportat.ion Co. v. La,mb, (Okla.) 123 
l:lac. (2) 660, the plaintiff was riding as a guest in a 
vehicle traveling in the same direction as the defendant's 
bus. The roadway concerned was one of the main arteries 
of the State. The highway was straight. A cotton wagon 
was directly in front of the bus, but the bus was unable 
to pass because of an oncoming truck. The driver of the 
car in which plaintiff was riding testified that he was 
unable to see the cotton wagon and made an attempt to 
pass the bus, but had to swing back to avoid oncoming 
traffic just at the time the bus stopp·ed for the cotton 
wagon, thus precipitating a collision between the vehicle 
in which plaintiff was riding and the bus. There was 
evidence that the bus driver gave no signal of intention 
to stop. The case was submitted to the jury and a verdict 
11 
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returned in favor of plaintiff. The court held on review 
of the jury's verdict: 
"Upon consideration of the foregoing salient 
features. of this case in the light of the law applic-
able thereto, we conclude that when the driver of a 
motor vehicle of such a size that it obstructs the 
view of the road ahead for drivers of vehicles 
following him, brings his vehicle to a sudden stop 
in the traffic lane of one of the p-rincipal highway~ 
of the State, behind a slow moving vehicle and in 
front of an automobile traveling behind him, with-
out any signal of his intention to stop, under cir-
cumstances from 'vhich the jury could reasonab]y 
infer that he knevv of the presence of such automo-
bile behind him, and that he had an1ple oppor-
tunity to slow down gradually to avoid colliding 
with the vehicle in front, this court cannot hold as 
a matter of law that the driver exercised due care, 
and that there was an absence of proof sufficient 
to establish prima facie negligence." 
In the case a.t bar, both elements of liability are 
p·resent, namely: (1) failure to signal, and (2) sudden 
stop. Both elements were admitted by the plaintiff. In 
addition, in this case, as in the Stri1nple case, supra, 
the plaintiff knew that the dog 'vas directly in front of 
his car; that it was in1possible for the defendant to have 
been aware of the presence of the dog, because his vision 
would be obscured by plaintiff's vehicle. It 'vill be re-
membered that the dog was running along directly in 
front of plaintiff's vehicle and only two or three feet 
in front of his car. This, in and of itself and irrespective 
of statute, placed a duty upon plaintiff to signal the im-
minence of danger to the defendant, whose safety ,vould 
12 
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be imperiled by a sudden stop by the plaintiff. 
The duty to signal arose when the dog entered his 
path, not when he was suddenly forced to stop some 130 
feet further down the highway. Plaintiff did not need 
to move forward until the dog had cleared out of the 
way. Having chosen to proceed, he had plenty of time 
to give the signal, which the law required him to give. 
Plain tiff seeks to excuse his failure to give a signal 
on the fact that he was suddenly confronted with an 
emergency necessitating an emergency stop. It was not 
a sudden e1nergency as to plain tiff, because he was R\vare 
of the dog and anticipated he might have to stop at any 
1noment during the entire distance of 130 feet, 50 feet 
beyond the intersection. Plaintiff started out fron1 a 
stopped position, and it would, of course, require son1e 
time and distance to accelerate to ten miles per hour or 
1nore, as indicated by the officers' report. A driver in 
the position of defendant, practically stopp·ed immedi-
ately behind the lead car for the semaphore light, would 
normally assurne until notified to the contrary that the 
lead driver intended to proceed. Appellant seeks to place 
the entire burden upon the following vehicle, in this case 
defendant, but the lavv places a duty on the part of both 
drivers. Under circumstances where the lead driver is in 
a position to see the situation and knows he might be re-
cluired to stop at any moment, his duty to warn or signal 
is increased. However, instead of taking any precaution 
to warn follovving vehicles, plaintiff in this case mis-
takenly assumed there was no car to the rear and acceler-
13 
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ated his automobile until the instant he jammed on his 
brakes. 
We submit that under such circumstances, whether 
the plaintiff was negligent in violating his statutory duty 
to signal is at least a question of fact for the determina-
tion of the jury. When he knew of the situation, as he 
admittedly did, it could logically be argued that he, 
plaintiff, was. negligent as a matter of law. The jury cor-
rectly found he was negligent. 
In Donahrue v. Mazzoli, et al, (Cal.) 80 Pac. (2) 743, 
the accident happened near the corner of Norton and 
Mission Streets in San Francisco, California. The de-
fendant, the lead driver, was driving a Dodge truck. 
Plaintiff, following, was driving a Plymouth sedan. Both 
were proceeding at a speed of about 18 miles per hour. 
As they crossed the intersection, they slowed down to 
about 14 miles per hour. Having crossed the intersection, 
each increased his speed to about 18 miles per hour and 
continued forward. Plaintiff had been foilowing the de-
fendant at a distance of about 15 or 16 feet. A short dis-
tance beyond the intersection, the Dodge truck turned 
slightly to the right and stop·ped. Plaintiff was unable 
to avoid colliding with the rear end of the truck. There 
was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the defendant 
had given a signal. The jury's verdict below was in favor 
of the plaintiff and defendants appealed. The court held: 
"Cases involving rear end collisions are many. 
Prima facie each case imports negligence and 
explanations are in order. Many different ~itua­
tions are presented, and in each specific case due 
consideration becomes necessary to ascertain 'each 
14 
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pertinent circumstance, and then give it due con-
si'deration. Although the contention has often 
been made that the leader alone was guilty of 
negligence or tha.t the follower alone was guilty 
of negligence, in general it has been held that the 
case as made by each party presented a question 
of fact for the jury and was not solely a question 
of law for the court." 
Denver Tra1nway Corporation v. Burke, (Colo.) 28 
Pac. (2) 253. Plaintiff brought this action for injuries 
sustained in a rear-end collision with a bus. We quote 
from the C·ourt's opinion: 
"There is evidence which justified the jury 
in believing: That the bus was stopped practically 
in the center of the street; that plaintiff could not 
see around it nor pass it without encroaching on 
the left side of the road; that the bus stopped at 
least nine feet from the curb; that between it and 
the curb workmen were cleaning the gutter, and it 
required three or four feet to clear them; that the 
bus carried a rear 'stop' red light on each side; 
that the bus stopped suddenly without any evi-
dence of its intention so to do, or indication that 
it n1ight unless it vvere the disputed flashing of its 
rear lights; that plaintiff, not knowing that the 
bus would stop, started to pa.ss it, and by reason 
of her want of knovvledge and the sudden stopping 
of the bus collided with it. * * * Plaintiff repeat-
edly testified that she was looking, could have seen 
the stop lights had there been any, an'd did not see 
them. She was not asked if she could say posi-
tively that there were no such lights. I-Iovvever, 
in ansvver to the question :X~ * * 'Did you see it 
(the bus) in the act of coming to a stop~ She an-
S\vered: "I saw it in the street, but I did not kno\v 
it \Vas going to co1ne to a stop. ~rhere was no sig-
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nal whatever." ' There is nothing negative about 
that evidence. It could not be more p-ositive. It 
was never withdrawn nor weakened by explana-
tion, and it was a part of plaintiff's case in chief. 
Under any theory of other evidence it presented 
a clear question of fact on conflicting testin1ony 
and that question was for the jurors. It sent con-
tributory negligence, as well as negligence, to then1 
for final decision. 
"Ordinarily a driver who collides with a car 
ahead of him, going in the same direction, is negli-
gent but not always so. Surrounding facts and 
circumstances are always relevant and material 
and may throw an entirely different light on the 
question. Perhaps the strongest case relied on by 
the tramway, and on which rests its requested in-
struction No. 4 is Sniffen v. Huschle, et al, 121 
Misc. 58, 200 N.Y.S·. 206; but it is not in point. 
There the first vehicle stopped to avoid striking 
a child who had run in front of it. 'This was as 
mucli a warning to the second car as the first. 
But see Greenberg v. Robertson Stelling Corp., 
222 Ap·p. Div. 21, 225 N.Y.S. 829, which appears 
to overrule the Sniffen case." 
Miller et al v. Minneapoli-s Street Railway, et al, 
(Minn.) 59 N.W. (2) 923. Plaintiff, shortly after passing 
an intersection, stopped to make a left turn into an alley-
way. He did not signal his intention to turn. He was 
struck from the rear by a street car. At the close of the 
evidence, plaintiff movPrl for a directed verdict. The 
court held: 
"The motion was properly denied. From a re-
view of th·e evidence the negligence of defendants 
at most was a question for the jury. * * * From 
a review of the evidence presented, there appears 
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to be ample evidence of ne_gligence on the part of 
plaintiff, Vernon Miller, the driver of the auto-
mobile. There was testimony that, after passing, 
Miller pulled in front of the street car an:d stopped 
without giving any left-turn signal. His contribu-
tory negligence was a question for th·e jury." 
The jury was entitled to consider whether defendant 
might have slowed or stopped or lengthened the distance 
between the two cars had he received any signal or warn-
Ing. vVe quote a portion of defendant's testimony: 
"Q. Had you at any time seen a dog in that vi-
cinity~ 
A. No. 
Q. If there was one it was out of your vision f 
A. Yes. 
Q. At any time had you looked at the clock that 
reference has been made to up there~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you look at the clock~ 
A. Before I crossed the 'vest pedestrian lane. 
(R. 163) 
* * * * 
Q. Then where was your attention from then on~ 
A. On the car in front of me. 
Q. Now could you see whether or not Mr. Sturda-
vant, who was driving the CadillHc, whether 
or not he made any arm signal or signal to 
slow down to stop~ 
A. I never seen it. 
Q. Were you in a position to see if he hud put 
his arm out~ 
17 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And was there any? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see any reason at all why he should 
have come to this stop there' 
A. No, I didn't. (R. 164) 
Q. Did you know he was going to stop' 
A. No." (R. 165) 
Then on cross-examination he testified: 
"Q. Mr. C-o~gton, after you had started through 
this intersection and after Mr. Sturdavant 
haJd started up from his stopped position, 
did you continue to drive along at such speed 
that you thought you could stop short of im-
pact were he to stop? 
A. If I had knowed he w·as going to stop, yes. 
Q. Did you continue to watch ahead of you as 
you traveled down to the point of impact? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you continue to watch the Cadillac car at 
all times? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you do everything you could? 
A. Yes." (R. 174) 
Again we repeat that when plaintiff knew he might 
be required to stop, and defendant had no such knowl-
edge, a timely signal or warning would have been seen 
and heeded by defendant. At lea.st the jury could have 
so found. 
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In Fl,ipp·en v. Millwa.rd, (Utah) 234 Pac. (2) 1053, 
the accident was a rear-end collision at the intersection 
just north of the main intersection in Layton, Utah. 
rl,he accident occurred in the morning on a very foggy 
day. There was evidence from which a jury could believe 
that plaintiff had stopped or suddenly slowed her vehicle 
without signalling. Plaintiff, appellant, contended that 
there was no such evidence and that the lower court com-
mitted prejudicial error in instructing in substance that 
plaintiff was required to give a signal of her intention 
to stop or slow down. The court held: 
"From the· evidence we have outlined above a 
jury could have reasonably found that if both ap-
pellant's and respondent's testimony were true 
as to the rate of speed their cars were traveling 
prior to the accident that the accident could not 
have occurred unless appellant had either sud-
denly stopped or suddenly decreased her speed. 
* * * Both from the oral testimony as to the 
speed the cars were traveling and the testimony 
from which a jury could have reasonably believed 
that appellant's car came to rest approximately 
12 to 15 feet directly in front of respondent's car 
after the impact, and from the additional fact that 
appellant had to cross a culvert into a rather 
narro-vv street in a dense fog to reach her destina-
tion, a jury could have reasonably found that she 
had suddenly decreased her speed without giving 
an appropriate signal and that this contributed to 
the accident. The court, therefore, did not err 
-vvhen it gave the instruction." 
The case at bar presents an even stronger situation 
than the Flippen case, for the proposition that the fail-
ure to signal contributed to the accident. 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Marley v. Wichita Tra;ns. Corp., (Kan.) 96 Pac. 
(2) 877, plaintiff brought an action for injuries received 
while she was riding as a passenger in a taxi cab which 
was struck from the rear by a b·US. The evidence was 
conflicting. Plaintiff's evidence indicated that the cab 
pulled up at an intersection to stop for a red light and 
had been stop·ped for a few seconds when struck in the 
rear. The bus company's evidence showed that the cab 
cut in front of th·e bus and stop·ped suddenly without 
signalling a distance of 150 feet from the intersection. 
The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff. 
Interrogatories were also answered, which supported 
the defendant's theory. On motion of the defendant, judg-
ment was accordingly entered for defendant. 
On appeal by the plaintiff, the court held: 
"As heretofore indicated, our examination of 
the evidence leads to the conclusion that either 
the plaintiff's or the defendant's version of what 
happened must be accepted. By the answers to 
special questions 1 to 4, inclusive, the jury found 
the defendant's version to be correct. So consider-
ed there was one and only one direct and proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and under 
the answer to question 7 that cause was the man-
ner in which the. taxicab was driven and not any 
negligence of the defendant." 
We resp~ectfully submit that the issues of negligence 
and contributory negligence were properly submitted to 
the jury under the court's instructions and rightly de-
eided by the jury. 
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POINT II. 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY 
OF NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION FOR. THE DETER-
MINATION OF THE JURY. 
This question has been substantially covered under 
respondent's first point and reference heretofore made 
to the testimony of both parties. Appellant claims that if 
defendant had "been back a little distance" the collision 
would not have occurred. In this regard, if plaintiff had 
given a signal or warning, defendant would have slowed 
or stopped, and in consequence been a greater distance 
back. To the contrary, he was induced to believe that 
plaintiff was in the clear and was in fact proceeding 
ahead. 
Some of the questions propounded by plaintiff's coun-
3el to defendant (set forth in appellant's brief) were ob-
jectionable, and objections made, as calling for conclu-
sions and faile:d to take in to consideration the matter of 
plaintiff's failure to give any signal or warning (R. 173). 
rrhese questions were not only ilnproper as invading the 
province of the jury, but were misleading to the witness. 
On re-direct examination, defendant \Vas asked and he 
answered as follows : 
"Now ~{r. Black questioned you about how 
far you \Vere back fro1n this car ahead of you 
and whether you could have stopped under certain 
conditions. Now, if there had been a hand signal 
used by Mr. Sturdavant signalling he was going 
to stop, were you far enough back of hirn that you 
could have stopped within time if you had received 
such a signal for a substantial distance 1 
A. Yes. 
01 ~-
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Q. You say you could have stopped in time~ 
A. Yes." (R. 176) 
He had previously testified on cross-examination as fol-
lows: 
"Mr. Covington, after you had started 
through this intersection, and after Mr. Sturda-
vant had started up from his stopped position, did 
you continue to drive along at such speed that you 
thought you could stop short of impact with hiln 
were he to stop~ 
A. If I had known he was going to stop, yes. 
Q. Did you continue to watch ahead of you as 
you traveled down to the point of impact~ 
A. Yes." (R. 174). 
In Wallac·h v. Lig·htning Electric Co., (N.J.) 161 
Atl. 680, defendant Dunham was driving a vehicle owned 
by the defendant, Lightning Electric Company. Dunham 
testified that he was following plaintiff's vehicle at a dis-
tance of about 8 or 9 feet at 20 miles per hour, and that 
plaintiff's car stop·p•ed "very short" at a cross street. 
There was no proof of traffic conditions or that plain-
tiff gave a signal of his intention to stop. The· only ex-
planation given by defendant was that plaintiff suddenly 
stopped, and that defendant "could not stop as good as 
he could." The lower court directed a verdict for plain-
tiff. On appeal by defendants, the court held: 
"It is quite likely that the jury would have 
found negligence as a fact on the part of defend-
ants. But we are unable to say, and we think that 
the court below erred in holding, that there was 
negligence as a matter of law. The mere fact that 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a vehicle is moving in close proximity to a vehicle 
moving ahead and keeping up with it, does not of 
itself constitute negligent conduct per se. Jackson 
v. Geiger, 100 N.J. Law, 330, 126 A. 438, Simpson 
v. Snellenburg, 96 N.J. Law 518, 115· A. 403, 24 
A.L.R. 503, Goolsby v. Public Service Co. Trans-
port, 157 A. 124, 9 N. J. Misc. 1158. 
"The case should have gone to the jury on the 
question of liability." 
See also Donahue v. Mazzoli, et al·, (Cal.) 80 Pac. 
(2) 743; Denver Tramw·ay Corp. v. Burke, (Colo.) 28 
Pac. (2) 253; and Flippen v. Millw·ard (Utah) 234 Pac. 
(2) 1053, supra, and other cases heretofore discussed. 
In the Flippen case, the following instruction was 
held to be proper: 
"You are instructed that no person shall sud-
denly decrease speed of a vehicle without first giv-
ing an appropriate signal which would indicate 
to a driver immediately to the rear that said ve-
hicle \Vas going to decrease its sp·eed; and if you 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff suddenly decreased her speed upon said 
highway without giving a signal that could be seen 
and observed by a driver in the rear and that her 
failure to give such signal in sufficient time to 
warn defendant caused or contributed to the acci-
dent and tlie resulting injuries, if any, then your 
verdict shall be in favor of defendant on plain-
tiffs' cornplaint, no cause of action." 
POINT III. 
IF DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT PER SE, ANY POS-
SIBLE ERROR WAS CURED BY THE VERDICT OF THE 
JURY. 
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We have heretofore pointed out that the jury in re-
turning the verdict in favor of plaintiff on defendant's 
counterclaim ap·parently found that both parties were 
guilty of negligence or contributing negligence. There-
fore, even if it should be assumed that defendant was 
negligent as a matter of law (and respondent contends 
that he was not), the error, if any, was cured by the 
verdict. 
C.J.S. Vol. 5, App1eal OIYIAd Error, Sec. 1758: 
"Any error committed by the trial court in 
p·assing on a mot~on for a directed verdict is not 
a gro111Y1Ad for revers!al wnless, undler the circun~­
stOJnC:es it w~as p·rejudicial. * * * 
"Erroneous refusal to direct. In respect of 
an erroneous refusal to direct a verdict, it has 
. been held that the error is not prejudicial where 
the jury found correctly; where the verdict is for 
the p•arty making the motion; * * *" 
In Pierce v. Isabel, et at, (Ohio) 36 N.E. (2) 64, the 
court said and held : 
"We have no difficulty in arriving at the con-
clusion that the trial court should have directed a 
verdict in favor of defendant, Constant A. Isabel, 
at the close of plaintiff's testimony, but the ver-
dict of the jury cured this failure to comply with 
. proper procedure." 
S·ee also Sharp· v. Faulkner, (Ky.) 166 s .. w. (2) 62. 
Likewise in the instant case, when the· jury appar-
ently found that both p·arties were guilty of negligence, 
and by that finding returned a verdict in favor of plain-
tiff on defendant's counterclaim, any possible error on 
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behalf of the lower court in submitting the issue of de-
fendant's negligence to the jury could not be prejudicial 
to plain tiff. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDEN·CE AND VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT 
MUST BE CONSIDERED FROM THE STANDPOINT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The general rule of law concerning the presumptions 
vvhich favor sustaining a general jury verdict is contain-
ed in 3 Am. Jur. pg. 513 (Appeal arnd Error) : 
"The presumptions which will be indulged 
with respect to the verdict of a jury are, in gen-
eral, those which tend to sustain its validity. 
Every reasonable presumption exists in favor of 
a general verdict." 
The evidence in this case, and all reasonable in-
ferences to he drawn therefrom in favor of the defendant 
support the finding of the jury that the negligence of the 
plaintiff proximately caused or proximately contributed 
to the accident, and the verdict for defendant based on 
that evidence should be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
It is frequently said that each case must be decided 
on its own particular facts and circumstances. As to 
when an issue should he withdrawn from the jury, this 
court recently stated in Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc. (Utah) 
249 Pac. (2) 213, at page 215, that "matters of negligence, 
contributory negligence and proxiinate cause generally 
are jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts are of 
such conclusive character as to require all reasonable 
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minds to con-clude that the ultimate fact of negligence, 
contributory negligence or proximate cause does or does 
not exist." 
In the instant case, it is without disp,ute that plaintiff 
was tlie one with knowledge of the situation and the one 
obligated to warn the following vehicles of the approach-
i,ng danger. During the entire distance, he anticipated 
he might have to stop at any moment. It is equally with-
out dispute that plaintiff came to a sudden and abrupt 
stop and gave rio signal or warning of his intention to so 
do. 
We respiectfully submit that the issues were rightly 
submitted to the jury and that the verdict should be sus-
tained. 
Respe:ctfnlly submitted, 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
R:esponden.t 
520 Continental_Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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